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Abstract
We analyze wholesale pricing and retail pricing when a monopolistic manufacturer sells its
product to a high street retailer and an online electronic retailer, which have different selling
qualities and marginal selling costs. We observe that (1) the wholesale price for an online
electronic retailer is higher than that for a high street retailer if an online electronic retailer's
selling cost advantage is greater than its selling quality disadvantage for all consumers
buying products, and (2) the retail price of the e-retailer is necessarily lower than that of the
c-retailer independent of conditions.
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“Manufacturers, including Sony, are charging shopping websites wholesale prices between 10
and 15 per cent higher than their prices to high street stores, the trade group that repre-
sents online sellers says. The rises mean that e-retailers will ﬁnd it diﬃcult to carry on
undercutting prices in the high street.” (The Times, November 15, 2005.)
The above newspaper article reported wholesale price discrimination of manufacturers
between conventional high street retailers (referred to hereafter as c-retailers) and online
electronic retailers (referred to hereafter as e-retailers). It is seemingly surprising that man-
ufacturers set higher wholesale prices for e-retailers which would sell products at lower price
than c-retailer. However, on careful consideration, it would not be surprising that manufac-
turers set diﬀerent wholesale prices for c-retailers and e-retailers, because the environment
for sale, including marginal selling costs, market area, target consumers, etc., diﬀer between
c-retailers and e-retailers. The present study investigates wholesale pricing decisions of a
monopolistic manufacturer when the manufacturer sells its products to two diﬀerent types
of retailers: a c-retailer and an e-retailer.
The issue of wholesale price discrimination is identical with that of third-degree price
discrimination in intermediate good markets, which was analyzed by Katz (1987), DeGraba
(1990), and Yoshida (2000) as fundamental theoretical study. Their studies assumed a two
stage game in which a monopolistic upstream ﬁrm ﬁrst decides the price for oligopolistic
downstream ﬁrms on the intermediate goods markets and then downstream ﬁrms decides
the quantity to sell on the ﬁnal goods markets, based on the price given by a upstream ﬁrm.
As the result, they showed that a monopolistic upstream ﬁrm charges diﬀerent prices to
diﬀerent downstream ﬁrms and prohibiting this price discrimination might improve social
welfare. Yet more recent studies considered that a upstream ﬁrm charge a two-part tariﬀ
to downstream ﬁrms, and considered that downstream ﬁrms having a symmetric demand
function are engaged in price competition (O’Brien and Shaﬀer (1994), Caprice (2006), and
Rey and Tirole (2007)).
On the other hand, most studies regarding competition between c-retailers and e-retailers
assumed that c-retailers and e-retailers have an asymmetric demand function respectively
and are engaged in price competition, because c-retailers and e-retailers have diﬀerent market
areas1 and diﬀerent selling methods2, and, as described in the above quoted article, e-retailers
appear to sell at prices below those of c-retailers. Balasubramanian (1998), Bouckaert (2000),
and Nakayama (2003, 2007) assumed that while the market area of c-retailers is limited near
their stores, e-retailers do not require speciﬁc areas, and they used the price competition
model with horizontal (geographical) diﬀerentiation. Chiang et al. (2003) assumed that
e-retailers are inferior to c-retailers regarding selling quality based on the result of Kacen et
al. (2002) where the willingness to pay for a product sold by an e-retailer is lower than that
for an identical product sold by c-retailers, and they used the price competition model with
vertical (product quality) diﬀerentiation.
1Market area of c-retailers is limited near their stores, while e-retailers do not require speciﬁc areas.
2C-retailers sell products through face-to-face, while e-retailers sell products through web site.
1We follow Chiang et al. (2003) to model competition between c-retailers and e-retailers,
that is, we use the price competition model with horizontal vertical diﬀerentiation, and we
assume the following: (1) consumers are heterogeneous in the valuation of products, (2)
the valuation that each consumer places on a product are spread uniformly, and (3) when
consumers buy a product from an e-retailer, the valuation is discounted at a constant rate.
Moreover, selling costs between c-retailers and e-retailers would be diﬀerent by diﬀerent
selling methods, and thus we assume that c-retailers and e-retailers incur diﬀerent marginal
selling costs respectively. Under these assumptions, we consider a two stage game in which
at ﬁrst stage, a monopolistic manufacturer decides the wholesale price for a c-retailer and
an e-retailer, and at second stage, based on the wholesale price given by a manufacturer, a
c-retailer and an e-retailer decide the retail prices respectively.
By solving this game, we show the following results: in regard to retail pricing, the retail
price of the e-retailer is necessarily lower than that of the c-retailer independent of conditions.
On the other hand, in regard to wholesale pricing, the wholesale price for the e-retailer is
higher than that for the c-retailer when the e-retailer’s selling cost advantage (which means
c-retailer’s selling cost minus e-retailer’s selling cost) is greater than the e-retailer’s selling
quality disadvantage (which means a valuation discount when a consumer buy a product
from e-retailer) for all consumers.
The present paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives wholesale and retail pricing
when a monopolistic manufacturer sells its products to a c-retailer and an e-retailer. Section
3 presents the concluding remarks.
2. Wholesale and retail pricing by a manufacturer, a c-retailer, and an e-retailer
We consider the case in which one monopolistic manufacturer sells its product to one c-
retailer and one e-retailer. The monopolist manufacturer can oﬀer each retailer diﬀerent
wholesale prices.3 wc denotes the wholesale price for the c-retailer, and we denotes the
wholesale price for the e-retailer. The manufacturer incurs the constant marginal product
cost, denoted by cm, and the c-retailer and e-retailer incur constant marginal selling costs,
denoted as cc and ce, respectively. As a result, the proﬁts for each retailer are determined
by
¼c = (pc ¡ wc ¡ cc)Dc(pc;pe);
¼e = (pe ¡ we ¡ ce)De(pc;pe);
where Dc(pc;pe) and De(pc;pe) are demand functions of each retailer, and the manufacturer’s
proﬁt is determined by
¼m = (wc ¡ cm)Dc(pc;pe) + (we ¡ cm)De(pc;pe): (1)
3We assume that the manufacturer does not permit retailers to buy and sell the manufacturer’s products
from other retailers.
2The manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg price leader. In other words, in the ﬁrst stage, the
manufacturer sets the wholesale prices for the c-retailer and the e-retailer, and then in the
second stage, the c-retailer and the e-retailer choose the respectively retail prices based on
the wholesale prices.
Before beginning the analysis of wholesale pricing and retail pricing, we need to formulate
demand functions of each retailer, and thus, we analyze the product choice of consumers
between the e-retailers and the c-retailers. When consumers buy a product from an e-retailer,
they select a product based on a virtual description of the product, using text, graphics, or
symbols in a web page catalog and have no information regarding the feel, taste, or smell
of the product. Therefore, consumers buying a product from an e-retailer would be more
likely to make a poor product choice as compared to a consumer buying a product from a
c-retailer4. If a consumer is granted a refund for such a product, the consumer incurs the cost
to return the product (which includes transportation costs, restocking fees, shipping charges,
etc.). Thus, risk-averse consumers would estimate the value of a product sold by an e-retailer
to be lower than a product sold by a c-retailer even if the e-retailer and the c-retailer sell
the same product. An empirical study by Kacen et al. (2002) also showed that consumers
evaluate e-retailers lower than c-retailers with respect to “uncertainty about receiving the
correct item”, “charges for shipping and handling”, and “exchange-refund policy for returns”,
as a result, the willingness to pay for a product sold by an e-retailer is lower than that for
a product sold by c-retailers. Thus, we assume that the customer’s reservation price for a
product sold by an e-retailer is discounted below the customer’s reservation price, v, for a
product sold by a c-retailer and is denoted by µv (0 < µ < 1. Here, µ is given exogenously).
Moreover, in order to prevent each retailer from not entering this market, we assume that
cc + cm < 1 and ce + cm < µ. When the e-retailer oﬀers the product at price pe, the net
consumer surplus is µv ¡ pe by buying the product from the e-retailer. If this surplus is
greater than 0 (i.e., µv ¡ pe > 0), a consumer might buy the product from the e-retailer.
However, a consumer can buy the product not only from the e-retailer but also from the
c-retailer. Thus, if the surplus derived from the e-retailer is greater than 0 and equal to or
greater than the surplus derived from the c-retailer (i.e., µv¡pe ¸ v¡pc), a consumer would
buy from the e-retailer and the consumer would obtain a surplus of µv ¡ pe. Conversely, if
the surplus derived from the c-retailer is greater than 0 (i.e., v ¡ pc > 0) and larger than
the surplus derived from the e-retailer, a consumer would buy from the c-retailer and would
obtain a surplus of v ¡ pc.5 Therefore, the demand function of each retailer are
Dc(pc;pe) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :




if pe=µ · pc · (1 ¡ µ) + pe;
0 if pc > (1 ¡ µ) + pe;
4We implicitly assume that consumers incur a large search cost each when they visit either c-retailer or
e-retailer. Therefore, we assume that consumers will not buy a product from e-retailer after they see a real
product from c-retailer.
5If both the surplus derived from the c-retailer and the surplus derived from the e-retailer are equal to
or less than 0, we assume that the consumer would not buy the product and would obtain a zero surplus.
3De(pc;pe) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 if pc < pe=µ;
µpc ¡ pe
µ(1 ¡ µ)




if pc > (1 ¡ µ) + pe:
Figure 1 illustrates the surplus derived from each ﬁrm. If the demands of both retailers is
more than 0, consumers that estimate a product to be of high quality will buy the product
from the c-retailer, and consumers that estimate a product to be of lower quality will buy
the product from the e-retailer. When the value that consumers place on the product is
lower, the absolute discounted reservation price for the e-retailer’s product is smaller, and
the consumers’ choice is aﬀected by the retail price more than product quality.
Since we formulated demand functions, we derive the equilibrium. We ﬁrst assume the
case of equilibrium in which both the c-retailer and the e-retailer have a positive demand.
The proﬁts for each retailer are determined by













In the second stage, the c-retailer and the e-retailer determine their prices so as to
maximize their proﬁts based on the wholesale prices. The ﬁrst-order conditions of (2) and
(3) with respect to the retail price give the retail price equilibrium as follows6:
p
¤
c = 1 ¡





e = µ ¡
µ(1 ¡ wc ¡ cc) + 2(µ ¡ we ¡ ce)
4 ¡ µ
(5)
The demands of the c-retailer and the e-retailer in this retail price equilibrium are given
as:
Dc =
(2 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ wc ¡ cc) ¡ (µ ¡ we ¡ ce)
(1 ¡ µ)(4 ¡ µ)
(6)
De =
¡µ(1 ¡ wc ¡ cc) + (2 ¡ µ)(µ ¡ we ¡ ce)
µ(1 ¡ µ)(4 ¡ µ)
(7)
In the ﬁrst stage, the manufacturer determines the best wholesale prices for the c-retailer
and the e-retailer in order to maximize the manufacturer’s proﬁt. Since the manufacturer
anticipates the retail price equilibrium in the second stage, the ﬁrst-order conditions of (1)




cjDc>0;De>0 = cm + ±c=2; w
¤
ejDc>0;De>0 = cm + ±e=2:
6The second-order conditions are satisﬁed.
7The second-order conditions are satisﬁed.
4where ±c denotes 1 ¡ cc ¡ cm and ±e denotes µ ¡ ce ¡ cm.
This wholesale price for the c-retailer (e-retailer) is the same as the best wholesale price
of the manufacturer that sells its product to only the e-retailer. In other words, the man-
ufacturer decides the wholesale price for the c-retailer (e-retailer) as if there were only one
c-retailer (e-retailer) in the retail market. Note, however, that we assume that both the
c-retailer and the e-retailer have a positive demand. The wholesale prices must then satisfy
(2 ¡ µ)±c > ±e and µ±c < (2 ¡ µ)±e; (8)
Next, we assume the case of equilibrium in which the e-retailer does not have a positive
demand. The necessary condition for the existence of this equilibrium is that the e-retailer
cannot obtain a positive demand even if the e-retailer charges only its marginal cost plus the
wholesale price for the e-retailer (which equals ce + we). Then, the c-retailer would select
its price so that the e-retailer cannot obtain a positive demand even if the retail price of the
e-retailer is ce + we. Thus, the best response price of the c-retailer based on the wholesale
price is p¤
c = min[(1+cc+wc)=2;(ce+we)=µ], which depends on ce and we if we is suﬃciently
small. When the e-retailer cannot obtain a positive demand, the demand of the c-retailer
is 1 ¡ pc, and the proﬁt of the manufacturer is ¼m = (wc ¡ cm)(1 ¡ pc). Thus, the proﬁt of
the manufacturer would increase by decreasing the wholesale price for the e-retailer without
decreasing the wholesale price for the c-retailer. Then, the manufacturer would decide the
wholesale price for the e-retailer so as to satisfy the requirement that the right-hand side of
(7) be equal to zero. In other words,
¡µ(1 ¡ wc ¡ cc) + (2 ¡ µ)(µ ¡ we ¡ ce)
µ(1 ¡ µ)(4 ¡ µ)
= 0: (9)
Because ¼m = (wc ¡ cm)(1 ¡ pc), the best wholesale price for the c-retailer to maximize the
manufacturer’s proﬁt is w¤
cjDe=0 = cm + ±c=2, and by substituting w¤
c into (9) we derive the
best wholesale price for the e-retailer as
w
¤
ejDe=0 = cm + ±e ¡ µ±c=2(2 ¡ µ) · w
¤
ejDc>0;De>0:
Finally, we assume the case of equilibrium in which the e-retailer does not have a positive
demand. We can derive the retail and wholesale prices in the equilibrium, as well as in
the equilibrium in which the e-retailer does not obtain a positive demand. Thus, the best
wholesale price for an e-retailer to maximize the manufacturer’s proﬁt is w¤
ejDc=0 = cm+±e=2,
and the best wholesale price for a c-retailer is
w
¤
cjDc=0 = cm + ±c ¡ ±e=2(2 ¡ µ) · w
¤
cjDc>0;De>0:














cm + ±c=2; if (2 ¡ µ)±c > ±e;








cm + ±e=2; if µ±c < (2 ¡ µ)±e;
cm + ±e ¡ µ±c=2(2 ¡ µ); if µ±c ¸ (2 ¡ µ)±e:
(11)
From (10) and (11), w¤
c < w¤
e if and only if ±c < ±e, and w¤
c > w¤
e if and only if ±c > ±e.
Let us deﬁne the partial welfare for the consumer as the diﬀerence between the net surplus
of the consumer and the product and selling costs for the product that the consumer buys.
±c (±e) implies the partial welfare for the consumer evaluating the product at the maximum
when the consumer buys the product from the c-retailer (e-retailer). Therefore, ±c < ±e
implies that the partial welfare for the consumer evaluating the product at the maximum
is improved by buying the product from the e-retailer rather than the c-retailer8, and the
larger the diﬀerence between ±c and ±e, the more the partial welfare is improved. Moreover,
if and only if ±c < ±e, v ¡ cc ¡ cm < µv ¡ ce ¡ cm for 0 · v · 1, which implies that all of the
partial welfares for each consumer are improved by buying the product from the e-retailer
rather than the c-retailer. Thus, when ±c < ±e is satisﬁed, it is the most desirable from
a social welfare point of view that all consumers buy the product from the e-retailer, and
we say that the e-retailer is strictly eﬃcient. Summarizing this discussion, we obtain the
following proposition.
Proposition 1
When the e-retailer is strictly eﬃcient, the wholesale price for the e-retailer is higher
than that for the c-retailer, and vice versa. When the e-retailer is not strictly eﬃcient, the
wholesale price for the e-retailer is lower than that for the c-retailer, and vice versa.
When the e-retailer is strictly eﬃcient and some consumers buy the product from the c-
retailer, the wholesale pricing of the manufacturer in the equilibrium is not desired for social
welfare, because the partial welfare for the consumer is improved by buying the product
from the e-retailer rather than the c-retailer.
Moreover we obtain the following proposition with regard to the retail pricing in equilib-
rium.
Proposition 2
In equilibrium, if both retailers obtain a positive demand, the retail price of the c-retailer














8Since ±e ¡ ±c = (cc ¡ ce) ¡ (1 ¡ µ), another implication of ±c < ±e is that the e-retailer’s selling cost
advantage for the consumer evaluating the product at the maximum is greater than the e-retailer’s selling
quality disadvantage for the consumer.
6Proof: Since 0 < µ < 1, De(pc;pe) = 0 when pc · pe. Therefore, if both retailers get a
positive demand in equilibrium, p¤
c > p¤
e must be satisﬁed. Q.E.D.
When the e-retailer is strictly eﬃcient, the wholesale price for the e-retailer is higher than
that for the c-retailer, but the retail price of the e-retailer is lower than that of the c-retailer.
Since consumers conclude that the e-retailer’s selling quality is lower than the c-retailer’s
selling quality, the e-retailer has no way to survive in the market other than quoting lower
prices than the c-retailer whether the wholesale price for e-retailer is high or low.
3. Concluding remarks
We analyzed the wholesale and retail pricing for a c-retailer and an e-retailer that diﬀer
with respect to the selling quality and marginal selling cost. As a result, we found the
following. In regard to retail pricing, the retail price of the e-retailer is necessarily lower
than that of the c-retailer independent of conditions. In regard to wholesale pricing, when
the e-retailer is strictly eﬃcient, the wholesale price for the e-retailer is higher than that for
the c-retailer, and vice versa. When the e-retailer is not strictly eﬃcient, the wholesale price
for the e-retailer is lower than that for the c-retailer, and vice versa.
The newspaper article mentioned in the introduction reports that the wholesale price for
e-retailers is 10 to 15 percent higher than that for c-retailers. Judging from this report and
the result of the present paper, we conclude that e-retailers are strictly eﬃcient. The online
retailing would be excellent in cost performance, insomuch that price cutting to make up for
selling quality disadvantage would become no problem. Therefore, the manufacturer would
exploit the additional proﬁts of online retailers, and thus, the wholesale price for online
retailers would become higher than that for high street retailers.
When the e-retailer is strictly eﬃcient, social welfare is improved by buying the product
from the e-retailer rather than the c-retailer. Therefore, the wholesale price discrimination in
which the c-retailer is favored is not desired for social welfare, and forbidding the wholesale
price discrimination might be desirable. However, forbidding the wholesale price discrimi-
nation shuts out the c-retailer that is ineﬃcient from the market through price competition,
and strengthens the monopolistic power of the e-retailer, and as a result, social welfare might
worsen. Whether forbidding the wholesale price discrimination is desirable is left for future
research.
References
[1] Balasubramanian, S. (1998) “Mail versus Mall: A Strategic Analysis of Competition
between Direct Marketers and Conventional Retailers” Marketing Science 17, 181–195.
[2] Bouckaert, J. (2000) “Monopolistic competition with a mail order business” Economics
Letters 66, 303–310.
7[3] Caprice, S. (2006) “Multilateral Vertical Contracting with an Alternative Supply: The
Welfare Eﬀects of a Ban on Price Discrimination” Review of Industrial Organization 28,
63–80.
[4] Chiang, W. K., D. Chhajed, and J. D. Hess (2003) “Direct Marketing, Indirect Proﬁts:
A Strategic Analysis of Dual-Channel Supply-Chain Design” Management Science 49,
1–20.
[5] DeGraba, P. (1990) “Input Market Price Discrimination and the Choice of Technology”
The American Economic Review 80, 1246–1253.
[6] Kacen, J. J., J. D. Hess, and W. K. Chiang (2002) “Bricks or clicks? Consumer attitudes
toward traditional stores and online stores” Working paper, University of Illinois.
[7] Katz, M. L. (1987) “The Welfare Eﬀects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Inter-
mediate Good Markets” The American Economic Review 77, 154–167.
[8] Nakayama, Y. (2003) “Ryutsu Kinoh No Kikan Daitaisei Ni Kansuru Keizai Bunseki”
Ryutsu Kenkyu 6, 13–30 (in Japanese).
[9] Nakayama, Y. (2007) “A Model of Marketing Channel Choice in Internet Age” DEE
Discussion Papers 07–2, Nagoya University.
[10] O’Brien, D.P., and G. Shaﬀer (1994) “The Welfare Eﬀects of Forbidding Discriminatory
Discounts: A Secondary Line Analysis of Robinson-Patman” Journal of Law, Economics,
& Organization 10, 296–318.
[11] Rey, P., and J. Tirole (2007) “A Primer on Foreclosure” In: M. Armstrong, and R.
Porter (Eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization 3, Elsevier, Amsterdam.
[12] The Times (November 15, 2005) “End to online bargains as Sony forces prices higher”
(Newspaper).
[13] Yoshida, Y. (2000) “Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Input Markets: Output and









Figure 1: Consumer surplus (bold line: consumer buys the product from a c-retailer,
thin line: consumer buys the product from an e-retailer)